Florida Law Review
Volume 28

Issue 2

Article 17

January 1976

Labor's Exemption from Federal Antitrust Law: The Diminishing
Protection for Union Activity
James G. Paulsen

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James G. Paulsen, Labor's Exemption from Federal Antitrust Law: The Diminishing Protection for Union
Activity, 28 Fla. L. Rev. 620 (1976).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss2/17

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Paulsen: Labor's
Exemption from Federal Antitrust Law: The [Vol.
Diminishing
Pro
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
XXVIII
The distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech remains
viable, and apparently speech that is purely commercial will continue to
receive no first amendment protection. Although the Court did mention the
value of the advertisement to those in need of the referral services, it may
be inferred that in the ordinary commercial communication, which is devoid
of constitutional interests, the consumer information function will still be
accorded a lesser degree of protection. Nonetheless, the decision may be viewed
as a necessary and effective step to put lower courts on notice that the inflexible and simplistic primary purpose test of the commercial speech doctrine
can no longer be used to ignore first amendment interests inherent in commercial advertising.
DAVID

S.

BOYCE

LABOR'S EXEMPTION FROM FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW:
THE DIMINISHING PROTECTION FOR UNION ACTIVITY
Connell Construction Co. v. PlumbersLocal 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975)
Local 100, a union representing plumbing and mechanical workers in
Dallas, sought to have Connell Construction Co., a general contractor, sign
an agreement obligating it to deal only with subcontractors who were a
party to the union's current collective bargaining agreement. The union
neither represented nor had any interest in representing Connell's workers.
When the general contractor refused to sign the agreement, the union
stationed a picket at one of the general contractor's construction sites,
effectively halting work there. Under this duress, Connell signed the agreement but then filed suit alleging violation of the Sherman Act. 2 The Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Texas found that the union's
actions did not violate antitrust law because the subcontracting agreement
was authorized by a provision of section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations
Act.' Affirming this result, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
I. This type of agreement is commonly called a "hot cargo" agreement because of its
widespread use by the Teamsters Union. It involves persuading a neutral party to cease
doing business with or to stop patronizing certain persons or businesses. The Plumbers'
union used such agreements to put pressure on the mechanical subcontractors to conclude
a collective bargaining agreement with its Local.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (1970). Connell brought suit in the district court of Texas to obtain
injunctive relief against the union's picketing. Local 100 had the case removed to federal
district court, and Connell amended its complaint to allege a Sherman Act violation.
Connell also charged that the agreement it was forced to sign violated Texas antitrust law
and the Texas right to work law. The United States Supreme Court dismissed the state
antitrust claims as preempted by federal law, avoiding "a substantial risk of conflict
with policies central to federal labor law." Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100,
421 U.S. 616, 636 (1975).
3. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 78 L.R.R.M. 3013 (N.D. Tex. 1971). See
note 95 infra.
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concluded that the union was acting in its legitimate self-interest by seeking4
to organize mechanical subcontractors in the Dallas construction market.
Granting certiorari, 5 the Supreme Court reversed and HELD, a union loses
its antitrust exemption when, through an agreement with a nonlabor party,
it imposes direct restraints on competition in the business market "to a
degree not justified by congressional labor policy.'"6
In the struggle to solve industrial disputes, both Congress and the courts
have been confronted with the question of when the federal antitrust statute
seeking to preserve free competition will be applicable to labor union activity.
Because labor groups strive to end competition over wages and improve
working conditions, national policies that favor both the organization of
workers and competition in the business market will inevitably clash.7 Thus
an accommodation must be reached between these competing goals.
Although two commentators assert that Congress never intended that
the Sherman Act be applied to labor union activity," labor has never enjoyed
such a broad exemption from the antitrust laws. After the passage of the
Sherman Act in 1890, antitrust suits were frequently instituted against
labor unions, yet corporate monopolies were seldom attacked. 9 Construing
the Sherman Act literally,10 the Supreme Court concluded that the statute
was intended to reach every restraint of interstate commerce."' The Court's
interpretation caused a political debate' 2 resulting in congressional enactment of the Clayton Act"s in 1914. Section 6 of the Clayton Act specifically
4
stated that labor was not to be considered an article of commerce;' moreover,

4. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1973).
5. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 416 U.. 981 (1974).
6. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 625 (1975).
7. See Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust
Standards to Union Activities, 73 YAIax L.J. 14, 28-29 (1963).
8. For an analysis of congressional debate showing that Congress did not intend to
include labor organizations within the scope of the Sherman Act, see E. BERMAN, LABOR AND
THE SHERMAN ACr 3-54 (1930); Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes: I, 39 COLUm.
L. REv. 1283, 1285-89 (1939). Contra, A. MASON, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE LAW 119-31 (1925).

9. One commentator noted that in the first seven years after the passage of the
Sherman Act, "lower federal courts found unions in violation twelve times while only one
violation was found involving a business." Winter, supra note 7, at 31.
10. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 301 (1908). "The act made no distinctions between
classes. It provided that 'every' contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade

was illegal. The records of Congress show that several efforts were made to exempt, by
legislation, organizations of farmers and laborers from the operation of the act and that
all these efforts failed, so that the act remained as we have it before us." Id.
11. Id. One reason the Court may have failed to undertake a comprehensive study of
the legislative intent behind the Sherman Act is that the labor unions' attorneys did not
raise this issue in their briefs or arguments. See Boudin, supra note 8, at 1287.
12. See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCrION 139-44 (1930) for a brief
survey of congressional debates and proposals arising from the Supreme Court's decision

in Loewe.
13. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, 38 Stat. 730, codified at 15 U.S.C., §§12-27, 44 (1970); 29 U.S.C.
§§52, 53 (1970).
14. 15 U.S.C. §17 (1970).
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section 20 limited the injunctive remedies available to the federal courts
5
in a labor dispute.1
Despite the passage of the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court resisted the
political tide. In Duplex PrintingPress Co. v. Deering,16 the Court read "labor
dispute" to encompass only a controversy between an employer and his immediate employees; 17 thus, a secondary boycott was not a protected activity.The Duplex Court applied a broad standard of accountability when the
union departed from its "normal and legitimate" objectives. 19 By this standard,
judicial judgment on the propriety of union goals and activities became the
key issue, determining whether the union would be found to have violated
the Sherman Act.
This narrow interpretation of the Clayton Act in Duplex and succeeding
cases20 led Congress to clarify its labor policy by enacting the Norris-LaGuardia
Act 2 ' in 1932. This act proclaimed a public policy in favor of collective bargaining and the organization of individual workers for their "mutual aid or
protection."2 2 Specifically, the act redefined "labor dispute" to encompass a
broader range of activities regardless of whether "the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer to employee." 23 The act also stripped the
federal court of injunctive power against certain enumerated union activities.24

15. 29 U.S.C. §52 (1970). The final sentence of §20 states that the labor activities
enumerated in that section are not to be considered as "violations of any law of the
United States." Id. The acts specified in that section generally include: striking, persuading
others to strike, continuing to work, peacefully communicating information about the
labor dispute, ceasing to patronize a party to a dispute, persuading others to do the
same, giving strike benefits, and peacefully assembling. ld.
16. 254 U.S. 443 (1921). The International Association of Machinists sought recognition
and attempted to impose an eight hour day and uniform wage scale on plaintiff, a Michigan
manufacturer of printing presses. The union called a strike, organized a nationwide boycott
of the manufacturer's product, and threatened sympathetic strikes against any employer
who handled, shipped, or sold Duplex's printing presses.

17.
18.

Id. at 472.
Id. at 476-77.

19. Id. at 469. The Court noted that §6 of the Clayton Act declared that the union's
"normal objects" are legitimat,2 and that the Sherman Act was not to be construed as
restraining union "members from lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects." Id.
(emphasis original). Once the union departed from what the Court considered its normal
and legitimate objectives, it was fully subject to the Sherman Act.
20. See, e.g., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927)
(the Court granted injunctive relief to an employer when a union sought recognition by
requiring its members not to handle Bedford's products); United States v. Brims, 272
U.S. 549 (1926) (the Court sustained a criminal conviction under the Sherman Act when
manufacturers and contractors agreed to employ only union carpenters in exchange for
the union's refusal to work with any "non-union made millwork"); Coronado Co. v. UMW,
268 U.S. 295 (1924) (the Court sustained an antitrust damage award when the union destroyed a nonunion mining company in order to eliminate the detrimental effect that
competition from the nonunion mine had on wages).
21. Act of Mar. 23, 1932, 47 Stat. 70, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§101-110, 113-115 (1970).
22. 29 U.S.C. §102 (1970).
23. 29 U.S.C. §113(c) (1970).
24. 29 U.S.C. §104 (1970). The activities enumerated in this section include: striking,
becoming a union member, paying strike or unemployment benefits, lawfully aiding anyone
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With this clear expression of congressional intent, the Supreme Court
began to reach decisions more favorable to union activity. In Apex Hosiery Co.
v. Leader,25 the Court noted that the elimination of price competition based
on wages was a legitimate objective of any labor organization and was not the
26
"kind of curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act."
The Apex decision also held that not all restraints imposed by labor are
that seek to restrict
proscribed by the Sherman Act; instead, only restraints
27
market competition are subject to antitrust liability.
One year later, in United States v. Hutcheson,2s the Court stated that

labor's exemption from federal antitrust law must be determined by construing the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and Norris-LaGuardia Act together.29
By this process the Court emphasized that "so long as a union acts in its
self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups .... ,"30 it is not
subject to federal antitrust liability. The Court concluded that its holding in
Duplex was no longer viable because of the congressional intent expressed in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.8 '
The Court in Hutcheson emphasized that there might be a different
result when a union combined with a nonlabor group. This exception to
labor's antitrust immunity gained meaning in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3,
1BEW.s 2 In this case the union had successfully set up a dosed shop agreement with electrical contractors and manufacturers in New York City. The
agreement obligated the contractors to purchase equipment only from local
manufacturers having collective bargaining agreements with the union; in
who is participating in a strike, publicizing a labor dispute, "patrolling," peacefully

assembling, and advising or agreeing with others to do any of these acts.
25. 310 U.S. 469 (1940). Apex involved the occupation and possession of a hosiery
factory by an organizing union. During this "sit-down" strike, the factory was severely

damaged, and the shipment of the manufacturer's hosiery was halted.
26. Id. at 503-04.
27. Id. at 512. Applied to this case, the Sherman Act was not the proper remedy for
a labor strike that led to violence and the union's occupation of the employer's property.
The labor union did interrupt the flow of the employer's goods in interstate commerce;
however, this restraint was not intended to end business competition or create a monopoly.

In short, the labor union's conduct was not one of the "evils" that the Sherman Act was
designed to eliminate. One commentator noted that the Apex decision gave the union
"effective shelter" in which to carry out the aims of collective bargaining. Handler, Labor
and Antitrust: A Bit of History, 40 A.B.A. ANTnTRUsr L.J. 233, 235 (1971).
28. 312 U.S. 219 (1941). This case involved a dispute between the United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of America and the International Association of Machinists over
the allocation of certain jobs on a construction project for Anheuser-Busch. The Carpenter's
union lost the dispute, refused to arbitrate, called a strike, and initiated a boycott of
Anheuser-Busch beer. See generally Gregory, The New Sherman-Clayton-Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 8 U. Cni. L. REv. 503 (1941); Nathanson & Wirtz, The Hutcheson Case: Another View,
36 ILL. L. REV. 41 (1941); Teller, Federal Intervention in Labor Disputes and Collective
Bargaining- The Hutcheson Case, 40 MicH. L. REv. 24 (1941).
29. 312 U.S. at 231. Justice Frankfurter, the author of the Court's opinion, had previously written a book criticizing the judiciary's widespread use of the labor injunction
to regulate union conduct. See F ANKrURTR, supra note 12.
30. 312 U.S. at 232.
31. Id. at 233-84.
32. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
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return, the local manufacturers were to sell locally only to contractors employing union members. The evidence indicated that the union had conspired with the contractors and manufacturers to fix prices, and that the
33
union had picketed nonunion competitors to drive them out of business.
The Allen Bradley Court stated that if the union had acted alone, its
activities, such as picketing nonunion employers, would have been immunized by the provisions of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act; 34 however, this immunity was lost when the union combined with

nonlabor parties to "aid and abet" the formation of a business monopoly. 35
After Allen Bradley, the Court did not disturb the formula for determining
labor's antitrust exemption for twenty years.3 6 In 1965 two cases, UMW v.
Pennington37 and Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co.,38 divided the
Court into three factions of three justices each. 39 The resulting confusion
failed to provide the lower courts with adequate guidance for future con40
troversies.
33. Id. at 800.
34. Id. at 807. This is a dichotomy that recurrs in Court decisions. See, e.g., UMW v.
Pennington, 380 U.S. 657, 664 (1965); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
When a union acts alone, it can do with apparent impunity what it may not do when it
combines with a nonlabor party. One commentator has criticized this distinction as lacking
in principle, stating: "[Tjhe union, acting unilaterally, could have inflicted the complained
of anti-competitive 'horribles' on the economy without incurring antitrust liability ...
One would expect that since the antitrust policies exist to protect the economy from anticompetitive strictures in the product market, antitrust liability would turn on such issue
relevant to the existence of such a stricture." DiCola, Labor Antitrust: Pennington, Jewel
Tea and Subsequent Meanderings, 33 U. Pirr. L. REv. 705, 714 (1972).
35. 325 U.S. at 808.
36. During this period the Supreme Court did review labor's qualified exemption from
the Sherman Act, but dealt mostly with Allen Bradley type conspiracies. See, e.g., Los
Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962) (a combination
between a labor union and "grease peddlers" to destroy competition in the purchase and
sale of waste grease); United States v. Employing Plasters Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954) (conspiracy among the union and the contractors' association to restrain competition among
the Chicago plastering contractors). See also Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemption After
Pennington and Jewel Tea, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 742, 746-49 (1966).
37. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
38. 381 U.S. 676 (1965). For extensive commentary on these two cases, see Cox,
Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L. REv. 317 (1966); DiCola,
supra note 34, at 705; Zimmerman & Silberman, Pennington and Jewel Tea: Antitrust Impact on Collective Bargaining, 11 ANTITRusT BULL. 857 (1966); Comment, Labor's Antitrust
Exemption, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 254 (1967); Comment, supra note 36, at 742; Comment, UnionEmployer Agreements and the! Antitrust Laws: The Pennington and Jewel Tea Cases,
114 U. PA. L. REv. 901 (1966).
39. The plurality opinion of the Court in Pennington and Jewel Tea was written
by Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan. In a separate
opinion, Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Clark, concurred in the judgment
of the Court in Pennington. Justice Douglas dissented from the Jewel Tea decision in
an opinion joined by the same two justices. Finally, in an opinion applicable to both cases,
Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, dissented from the opinion in
Pennington and concurred in the judgment of the Court in Jewel Tea.
40. "The aftermath of Pennington and Jewel Tea was the fragmentation of the laborantitrust exemption into a series of inconsistent rules and rubrics, each of which was
bad labor policy and bad antitrust policy in its own right." DiCola, supra note 34, at 725.
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Pennington involved an alleged conspiracy, between large coal operators
and the union, to impose the same wage scale on all coal producers in the
market, thereby ruining the small producers who would be unable to meet

union demands. The alleged conspiracy was rooted in a collective bargaining
agreement that provided the union with a higher wage scale in return for
pursuing a uniform wage policy and agreeing not to oppose mechanization. '
Justice White's plurality opinion for the Court emphasized that wage negotiations between a union and an employer were not automatically exempt
from the Sherman Act 4 2 The opinion noted that a union may conclude an
agreement with a multi-employer bargaining unit 4 3 and also unilaterally
pursue a uniform wage policy; 44 however, a union "forfeits its exemption from
the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of
employers to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units."'4 5
Justice White did not base his conclusion on a finding that the union acted
with predatory intent; instead, he treated the promise to demand the same
wage scale from other employers as if it imposed direct restraints on the
product market. 46 Actually, this agreement interfered with the collective
bargaining process because it imposed terms on employers who were not
represented at the bargaining session.47 Thus, Justice White's opinion involved
a rather confused balancing of the interests of labor and free competition. 48
Moreover, it resulted in the Court substituting its judgment for that of the
union in deciding the best course of conduct for the union to adopt in
The author concluded by noting that this is "hardly an attractive result unless one
thinks confusion a virtue." Id. Another commentator emphasized that the confusing result
of Pennington and Jewel Tea reinforces the view that the courts are not the proper forum
for harmonizing the irreconcilable policies of free competition and collective bargaining;
instead, a solution must be reached by Congress. Comment, supra note 36, at 762.
41. 381 US.at 660.
42. Id. at 664-65.
43. Id at 664. A multi-employer bargaining unit is an association of employers who
designate the association as their bargaining agent in contract negotiations with the labor
union.
44. Id. See note 34 supra.
45. 881 U.S. at 665.
46. See Comment, supra note 36,at 756.
47. 381 U.S. at 666. The Court noted that a union serves the interest of its members
best by remaining flexible in its bargaining position with each employer. This seemed to
put the Court in the position of telling the union what it should do. The Court
analogized to the hypothetical case of a group of employers asking the union to impose
a higher wage scale on other bargaining units. Such a practice would likely contain a
predatory intent, whereas agreeing to impose the same wage scale might simply reassure
the employer that he will not be ruined by this higher wage agreement. See Comment,
supra note 36, at 756. Archibald Cox stated that the Pennington decision will have an
undesirable practical effect on the collective bargaining process. An employer and the
union will no longer be able to safely discuss the economic consequences of their proposed
agreement, because, under the combined decisions of White and Douglas, proof of such
discussions might allow a jury to infer conspiracy to impose a uniform wage scale on
other bargaining units. Cox, supra note 38, at 323.
48. "In straining to harmonize essentially irreconcilable policies, Justice White appears
to have distorted both, formulating a criterion which, springs from neither." Comment,
supra note 36,at 756.
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reaching its goals. 49 The plurality opinion also rested on the alternative and

more substantial ground that there would be no antitrust immunity if the
union had conspired with the large producers to drive the small operators
out of the market. 50
The Pennington decision implied that a union-employer conspiracy can
be found by considering the effect that the collective bargaining agreement
has on the product market. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion suggested that
an industry-wide agreement that exceeds the ability of small operators to
pay would constitute prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation.-' This
signaled a greater judicial scrutiny of collective bargaining agreements beyond
that sanctioned by Allen Bradley.
In the companion case, Jewel Tea, the Court was faced with a collective
bargaining agreement in which Chicago area meat dealers agreed to a union
demand restricting the sale of fresh meat to the hours of 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
The Jewel Tea Co. signed this agreement under duress and then brought suit
alleging that the marketing hours restriction limited free competition.
Viewing these facts, Justice White's plurality opinion asked whether
the restriction on hours for selling meat is "so intimately related to wages,
hours and working conditions" that the union's successful attempt to gain
this condition in the employment contract is protected by the national policy
favoring collective bargaining. 2 Relying on the district court's conclusion
that absent a marketing hours restriction the butcher's workday would increase,5 3 Justice White found that the contract's time restriction provision
was shielded from antitrust attack.54 One problem with the Court's plurality
opinion in Jewel Tea is that it fails to clarify whether the union's conduct in
securing a marketing hours restriction was scrutinized as unilateral activity
or as activity undertaken in combination with a nonlabor group.5 5 The
trial court found no evidence of a conspiracy between the union and the
49. See note 47 supra.
50. 381 U.S. at 663.
51. Id. at 673. Douglas qualified this remark by noting that to prove a violation of
the Sherman Act evidence that the agreement was made "for the purpose of forcing some
employers out of business" would also need to be shown. Id. The question of whether
labor has retained its antitrust exemption and whether it has violated the Sherman Act
are two different issues with different standards of resolution. After labor has lost its
exemption, the court must still determine "whether the agreement restrains trade and
whether the restraint is unreasonable." Handler, supra note 27, at 239.
52. 381 U.S. at 689-90.
53. Jewel Tea Co. v. Meat Cutters Local 189, 215 F. Supp. 839, 846 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
54. 381 U.S. at 690.
55. Commentators have reached different conclusions as to whether Justice White's
opinion treated the union as acting alone or in a combination with a nonlabor group.
Compare Comment, supra note 36, at 745 with Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemption, 55
CALIF. L. REv. 254, 258 (1967). If the union acted alone, the only question that need be
considered is whether the union was acting in its self-interest. If the union was acting in
its self-interest, then it retains its exemption from the Sherman Act. See United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941). On the other hand, if the union combines with
nonlabor parties, then it is necessary to examine this combination to determine whether
it effects restraint of competition in the product market. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3,
IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 807 (1945).
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meat dealers, -i6 but the hours restriction was part of the collective bargaining
agreement. The Court's opinion also raises questions as to the scope of the
"intimately related" test. One possibility is that the determination of whether
a union demand is "intimately related" to wages, hours, and working conditions depends on a balancing of the union interests and the demand's effect
on competition.57 Alternatively, Justice White may only have intended to
consider whether the contract provision benefited the legitimate interests
of labor. 58
In an opinion applicable to both cases, Justice Goldberg concurred in
the result of Jewel Tea,59 and suggested that there should be antitrust immunity for any collective bargaining agreement concerning a "mandatory
subject of bargaining" under the labor statutes. 60 He argued that Congress
intended that most labor abuses be handled by remedies available under the
labor statutes, not by judicial determination of the desirability of certain
union activity. 61
In analyzing Pennington and Jewel Tea, two commentators concluded
that the Court permitted the narrow exception carved out in Allen Bradley -

the union combination with a nonlabor group test -to be more frequently
invoked than the broader rule, which allowed union activities a general
exemption from federal antitrust law.62 Without setting down any precise
standards, the Court in these two cases attempted to balance the interests of
labor and free competition; however, the decisions failed to articulate a consistent labor or antitrust policy. 63
56. Jewel Tea Co. v. Meat Cutters Local 189, 215 F. Supp. 839, 845 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
This finding by the trial court significantly limited the interpretations that the Supreme
Court could place on the marketing hours restriction.
57. See Comment, supra note 36,-at 757-58.
58. One writer suggested another interpretation of White's test. He felt it was similar
to the "direct-remote" test of Teamsters Local .24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 -(1959). Under
such a test: "[R]estraints which represent a direct approach to wages, hours and working
conditions are exempt. . ." DiCola; supra note 34, at 722. It should be noted that Oliver
dealt with a federal preemptibii question in which the Ohio antitrust law was held not
to be applicable to a labor-employer contract regulating minimum rental fees because the
agreement was protected by the collective bargaining policy of federal labor law. See
note 2 supra for a brief discussion of the federal preemption doctrine as applied to the
Connell case.
59. See note 39 supra.
60. 381 US. at 710. A mandatory. subject of bargaining is a topic on which an employer and union must bargain in good. faith. 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1970). Failure of either
party to do so would constitute an unfair labor 'practice and would subject the party to
the sanctions of the Labor Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. §§158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1970).
The statutory language requires the parties to "confer in good faith with respect tQo
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment .... " 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1970)..
It is this language that the NLRB and the courts must interpret when deciding what is a

mandatory subject of bargaining.
61. Id. at 707-10.
62. See DiCola, supra note 34, at 706; Comment, Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions, 15B.C. Ian. & Com. L. REV. 595, 604 (1974).

63. In Pennington, the union lost its exemption by surrendering its right to .bargin,
freely with other n6nunit employers, but, this activity. did not'resirain commercial' competition unless the agreement was made with the purpose of eliminiting conipetitors.. In
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During the next ten years, the Supreme Court examined two labor antitrust cases64 but did little to harmonize the different tests espoused by competing divisions of the Court. One decision65 held that the standard of proof
required to show a union-employer conspiracy was the usual preponderance
of the evidence test.66 This was a further narrowing of labor's exemption
because the lower courts had developed the more rigid standard of clear
68
proof.6 7 The second case, American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll,
involved a challenge by orchestra leaders of "club engagements"'6 9 to the
bylaws of the musicians' union. The bylaws at issue set minimum prices that
leaders could charge,70 contained provisions that pressured the leaders to
become union members, and laid down several other restrictions. The Supreme Court, affirming the district court's finding-' that orchestra leaders
were a labor group, 72 determined that there was no combination with a nonunion party. 7 3 The attack on the minimum price list was also rejected. The
Court recalled the language of Justice White in Jewel Tea that "[t]he crucial
determinant is not the form of the agreement ...

but its relative impact on

the product market and the interests of union members." 74 Applying this test,
the Court found the price list necessary to insure that the "sidemen" and the
leader received a minimum wage. 75 The Carroll case is important because
Jewel Tea, the union retained its exemption from the Sherman Act, even though the
restriction on the hours for selling fresh meats would eliminate some market competition
among meat dealers.
64. Ramsey v. UMW, 401 U.S. 302 (1971); American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll,
391 U.S. 99 (1968).
65. Ramsey v. UMW, 401 U.S. 302 (1971).
66. ld. at 309. The argument for the clear proof standard arises from §6 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, which requires clear proof that a union authorized the acts of its
members in order to hold the union responsible for these acts. 29 U.S.C. §106 (1970). The
Court emphasized that Congress intended the clear proof standard to be utilized only in
the situation set out in the statute and did not establish a new standard of proof "for
all issues in actions against a union." 401 U.S. at 309.
67. See Comment, Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions-Clear Proof Standard of Norris
LaGuardia Act, 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 383, 392-93 (1971).
68. 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
69. Club engagements are one night bookings to play at various social events.
70. The minimum price list was derived from the sum of: "(a) the minimum wage
scale for sidemen, (b) a 'leader's fee' which is double the sideman's scale when four or
more musicians compose the orchestra, and (c) an additional 8% to cover social security,
unemployment insurance, and other expenses." 391 U.S. at 104.
71. Carroll v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 241 F. Supp. 865, 887-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
72. This is determined by considering whether the orchestra leaders, who are classed
as independent contractors, and the union have an economic interrelationship affecting union
interests - such as competition over wages and jobs. If this relationship exists, then the
orchestra leaders are considered to be a "labor group" under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
391 U.S. at 105-06.
73. Justice White, in dissent, argued that the "orchestra leaders" were a nonlabor
group when they arrange engagements in which they do not themselves perform. 391 U.S.
at 117-20. Under these circumstances he felt that the labor union's activities were not antitrust immune and that the price fixing provisions were an unlawful restraint of trade, Id.
at 119-20.
74. Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 690 n.5 (1965).
75. 391 U.S. at 112.
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the majority utilized a balancing test even though they concluded that the
union had acted unilaterally.76 Surprisingly, the Court's decision struck a
balance in favor of labor, despite the fact that price-fixing usually constitutes
a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
Now, ten years after Pennington and Jewel Tea7 7 the Supreme Court
has rendered another decision diminishing labor's exemption from the Sherman Act. In the instant case,7 8 the Court began by dismissing the statutory
exemption of the Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act. Reasoning that the
statutory exemption does not cover "concerted action or agreements between unions and nonlabor parties," 79 the Court noted that Local 100's
agreement with Connell involved a combination with a nonlabor group. This
was a crucial step. The facts indicated that the contractor was forced to
sign the agreement because of the pressure of union picketing.8 0 Through
this reasoning, the Court made clear what was not explicitly stated in Jewel
Tea,8 1 namely that the requisite combination with a nonlabor party is created
by a contract even when the nonlabor party resists signing the agreement.
This result significantly broadens the Allen Bradley exception to labor's
antitrust immunity, an exception originally designed to deal with unionmanagement conspiracies.82 Thus the instant decision indicates that the anti76. One reason the Court may have utilized a balancing test is because of the hybrid
nature of the labor group in this case. See note 73 supra.
77. In interpreting the decisions of the Supreme Court since 1965, the lower federal
courts have avoided relying on any particular justice's opinion. To find a conspiracy with
a nonlabor group, the courts have consistently required proof of predatory purpose or a
design to injure or eliminate a competitor. See Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ. v. Ross
Aviation, Inc., 504 F.2d 896, 903 (5th Cir. 1974); Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk
Drivers Local 753, 422 F.2d 546, 553 (7th Cir. 1970). As one court pointed out, "[a] rule
of law requiring a lower level of intent than purpose would open the way to disastrous incursions upon Congressionally sanctified areas of labor union activity." Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical Univ. v. Ross Aviation, Inc., 504 F.2d 896, 903 (5th Cir. 1974). When it
was found that the union acted solely in its own self-interest, then it retained its exemption
from the Sherman Act. See Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United Farm Workers Organization
Comm., 494 F.2d 541, 558 (9th Cir. 1974); Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v.
New York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884, 887 (2d Cir. 1970); Cedar Crest Hats, Inc. v.
United Hatters, Cap & Mill Workers Int'l Union, 362 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1966). Two
lower courts have also found that no union combination with a nonlabor group existed
when the nonlabor party had been forced to meet the demands of the union. See Webb
v. Bladen, 480 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 1973); Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v.
New York Shipping Assn, 426 F.2d 884, 888 (2d Cir. 1970). What emerges from an examination of these decisions is an attempt by the lower courts to restrict the expansion of labor's
liability to the antitrust law.
78. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421' U.S. 616 (1975). This was a 5-4
decision, with Justice Powell speaking for the majority. Justice Douglas and Justice Stewart
submitted dissenting opinions. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined in Justice
Stewart's dissent.
79. 421 U.S. at 622.
80. The Court's conclusion was contrary to two court of appeals decisions that found
no combination when the nonlabor party was coerced into signing an agreement. Webb
v. Bladen, 480 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 1973); Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v.
New York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884, 888 (2d Cir. 1970).
81. See note 55 supra.
82. Under the Allen Bradley test, it §cqmd pegesary to find predatory intent or that
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trust exemptions of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia acts are no longer
available when the union is successful in demanding an agreement.
For the first time, the majority also clearly recognized a nonstatutory
exemption for labor arising from an attempt to reach an accommodation
between national labor policy and antitrust policy. 3 This nonstatutory exemption is designed to protect the congressional labor policy that allows labor
"to eliminate competition over wages and working conditions";8 4 nevertheless,
the Court noted that labor policy can provide no justification for union activity
that imposes direct restraints on competition among employers.8 5 The union
had a legitimate interest in organizing nonunion subcontractors, but this interest had to be balanced against the impact the "hot cargo" agreement
would have had on the business market. The Court concluded that the
effect of this agreement would have been to eliminate competition in the
mechanical subcontracting market. This conclusion was based on the Court's
belief that the "hot cargo" agreement would have removed subcontractors
from the market even if their competitive advantage resulted from efficiency,
rather than lower wages. 86
In addition, the Court examined this disputed agreement in light of the
most favored nation clause87 in Local 100's current collective bargaining contract. This contract with a multi-employer unit of subcontractors contained a
promise by the union to extend to this subcontracting association any more
favorable terms granted to other employers. Although this clause was not
under attack, 88 the Court found it significant in determining the effect that
the "hot cargo" agreement would have on competition. Viewing the two
the union had united with management to form a business monopoly. See text accompanying
notes 33-35 supra.
83. 421 U.S. at 622.
84. Id.
85. The Court indicated that a union could impose direct restraints on the market
only when it acted unilaterally. The majority cited the Carroll case as an example of the
broader freedom allowed a union when it acts alone. Id. at 622-23.
86. Id. at 623. The Court noted that efficiency was "a positive value that the antitrust
laws strive to protect." Id.
87. In labor contracts a most favored nation clause has several forms but usually
involves a promise by the union to extend to the employer any more favorable terms
negotiated with subsequent employers. The NLRB has concluded that a most favored
nation clause, of the type considered in Connell, is a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Dolly Madison Indus., Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1970). (The union had refused to bargain
about a most favored nation clause, charging that it violated the Sherman Act. The board
distinguished Pennington by arguing that the agreement did not force wages and conditions on other employers. In practice a most favored nation clause does lock the union into
one bargaining position.) In another case, a union was sued by an employers association to
enforce the terms of the most favored nation clause. The union raised the defense that
the clause violated the antitrust law. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals remanded
and held that the clause was not invalid unless it operated "in the same restrictive fashion"
as the agreement in Pennington. Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753, 422
F.2d 546, 554 (7th Cir. 1970). See also Comment, Antitrust Law-Most Favored Nation
Clause and Labor's Antitrust Exemption, 19 J. PUB. L. 399, 404-09 (1970).
88. The most favored nation clause may come under more frequent attack in the
future given the language of the majority in Connell, noting the potential anticompetitive
effects that they felt stemmed from the clause.
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agreements together, the Court foresaw Local 100 controlling access to the
mechanical subcontracting market as more such agreements were "exacted"
from general contractors.8 9 The Court was also concerned with the potential
restraints that this "hot cargo" agreement would make possible. For example,
the Court noted that the union would have the power to eliminate employers
that it disliked simply by refusing to sign a collective bargaining agreement.90
Finally, the Court noted that the union could not justify the agreement
on the ground of the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining because the union did not seek to represent Connell's employees. 91 Finding
that these anticompetitive effects substantially outweighed whatever support
the agreement derived from congressional labor policy, the Court determined
that the union had also lost its nonstatutory exemption from the Sherman
Act.
Although the case was remanded to determine whether the Sherman Act
had been violated, the Court clearly indicated that labor's antitrust immunity
may be lost without finding a conspiracy with a nonlabor party or predatory
intent on the part of the union. The evidence indicated that the nonlabor
parties were unwilling participants in the agreement, thus negating any
finding of conspiracy. Even though the terms of the agreement furthered a
legitimate union interest, the Court scrutinized the union's method of reaching this goal.92 In balancing the competing interests, the instant decision
considered potential as well as actual anticompetitive effects on the market.
Because the Court felt that the "hot cargo" agreement imposed direct restraints on competition, the failure to decide whether there was a Sherman
Act violation seems to have very little significance." In fact, the balancing
89. The facts indicate that five general contractors had already signed "hot cargo"
agreements with Local 100. 421 U.S. at 621.

90. Id. at 624-25. The Court also suggested that it was possible that Local 100 could
create a "geographical enclave" similar to that condemned in Allen Bradley. Id. at 625.
There was no evidence that Local 100 had undertaken any scheme to eliminate subcontractors from the market or had embarked on this campaign for any reason other than
to organize mechanical subcontractors. The majority, however, stressed that "the methods
the union chose are not immune from antitrust sanctions simply because the goal is legal."
Id.
91. Id. at 626. The Court left open the question of whether antitrust immunity would
be lost if Local 100 had sought to represent Connell's workers. The case draws a distinction
between labor policy and policy favoring collective bargaining. Possibly, the Court is returning to a position held in the Duplex case, which gave a union representing the employer's immediate employees a wider exemption from federal antitrust law. See text
accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
92. See note 90 supra.
93. It is difficult to imagine a case in which a labor union would lose its nonstatutory
antitrust exemption after application of the Connell balancing test and then not be found
to have violated the Sherman Act. Possibly, the complaint could fail because the alleged
violation did not sufficiently interfere with interstate commerce. On remand of the
Pennington case, the union was found not to have violated the Sherman Act; however,
the Supreme Court had splintered into three factions in Pennington, and the balancing
test was not as clearly articulated as it is in Connell. See Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F. Supp.
815 (E.D. Tenn. 1966), affirmed, 400 F.2d 806 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968).

In another case stemming from the same events as in Pennington, a jury verdict finding
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test for determining labor's antitrust exemption focuses on whether antitrust
policy is "contravene[d] . . . to a degree not justified by congressional labor
94
policy."

The majority in the principal case also summarily rejected the union's
argument that remedies under the National Labor Relations Act9" were intended by Congress to be exclusive.96 Justice Stewart's dissent, however, concluded, through careful examination of legislative history, that the N.L.R.A.
was designed to regulate the secondary activities of labor including "hot

the union guilty of a federal antitrust violation was affirmed. Tennessee Consol. Coal Co.
v. UMW 416 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970).
94. 421 U.S. at 625.
95. The picketing by Local 100 was secondary activity because the union did not
represent any of Connell's workers. Secondary activity is subject to the regulations of
§8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4) (1970). The "hot cargo"
agreement that Connell signed is governed by §8(e) of the same act. 29 U.S.C. §158(e) (1970).
Section 8(e) makes a "hot cargo" agreement an unfair labor practice; however, this section
contains the exception that §8(e) shall not apply "to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or
subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction ..
" Id. In Connell, the
labor union argued that its agreement was covered by this exception; therefore, antitrust
policy must "defer to the NLRA." 421 U.S. at 626. Arguing that Congress had not
intended such a broad loophole, the Court concluded that Local 100 was not within the
exception to §8(e) since the parties to the agreement were not in the relation of employer
to his immediate employees, and the agreement was not restricted to a particular job site.
Id. at 635. (The Court's opinion in Connell does not make clear whether the construction
industry proviso to §8(e) only authorizes a "hot cargo" agreement when the agreement
is reached in the context of a collective bargaining relationship and is limited to a particular
job site. Although a collective bargaining relationship is required, complying with the
job site restriction may be unnecessary. See 421 U.S. at 633.) Thus, the majority concluded
that the agreement constituted an unfair labor practice. This entitled the general contractor to recover all damages that he sustained because of the union's coercive conduct
under the provisions of §303 of the Labor Management Relations Act. See note 112 infra.
Justice Stewart in a footnote to his dissent argued that if "Congress intended what it
said .... " then the subcontracting agreement was valid under §8(e). 421 U.S. at 648 n.8.
The following three cases were cited by Justice Stewart to support this conclusion: Orange
Belt District Council of Painters No. 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
("Secondary subcontracting clauses in the construction industry are lawful, under the proviso
to Section 8(e), and economic force may be used to obtain them notwithstanding Section
8(b)(4)(A), because Section 8(b)(4)(A) incorporates that provisio by reference."); Construction
Laborers Local 383 v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963) (the court held that interpreting
§8(b)(4) and §8(e) together allows a union in the construction industry to picket to secure
a "hot cargo" agreement); Noitheastern Indiana Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 148
N.L.R.B. 854 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 352 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (the NLRB
reversed its earlier position and held that picketing to obtain a "hot cargo" agreement
was not an unfair labor practice, but in this case the union represented some of the
general contractor's employees). The Supreme Court had previously decided that if an
employer and a union had voluntarily put a "hot cargo" clause in their contract, and
the employer violated this clause, the union could not use any form of coercion, such as
picketing, to enforce the contract. Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
96. 421 U.S. at 634. The Court acknowledged that Congress in 1959 rejected the Alger
and Hoffman proposals to repeal labor's antitrust immunity. The Court noted, however,
that the rejection of these broad proposals did not mean that Congress "thought antitrust
liability under the existing statutes would be inconsistent with the NLRA." Id. at 634 n.16.
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cargo" agreements. 97 He further emphasized that Congress had rejected pro9s
posals allowing private parties to seek relief under the Sherman Act. Justice
Stewart warned that "judicial imposition of 'independent federal remedies'
not intended by Congress... threatens 'to upset the balance of power between
labor and management expressed in our national labor policy.'-9
The dissent also noted that since passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
courts have held that a union's secondary activity against a neutral employer
does not violate the federal antitrust law. 100 This position is supported by
reference to Hunt v. Crumboch.101 In that case a union forced a trucking
partnership out of business by first obtaining a closed shop agreement with
the partnership's main patron, A & P. The union then refused to sign a
contract with the trucking firm. This led the partnership to file suit alleging
a violation of federal antitrust law. The Supreme Court in Hunt held that
there was no Sherman Act violation, regardless of the power that this left in
the hands of labor unions. 0 2 The Hunt decision is not mentioned in the
majority opinion of the instant case, possibly because the union in Hunt did
represent some of A & P's employees, whereas none of Connell's workers were
represented by Local 100.
The instant decision, more clearly than Pennington and Jewel Tea, returns
the Court to a more active role in determining "what public policy in regards
to the industrial struggle demands.' 0 By distinguishing between the statutory
and nonstatutory exemptions for labor union activity, the majority does remove some of the confusion surrounding the determination of labor's antitrust exemption; yet, the Court supplied no specific criteria for the nonstatutory
balancing test beyond a vague weighing of competing goals. The accommodation reached in the principal case was intended to preserve competition in
the subcontracting market in Dallas, but the Court may also have increased
the likelihood that management will use the antitrust laws as a tool against
labor. 04 In fact, the holding of the instant case would support a law suit by
one of the parties forming the combination that is alleged to have violated
the antitrust law. In theory the general contractor could collect treble damages
Id. at 639.
98. Id. at 641-46, 650-54. Justice Stewart examined the legislative history surrounding
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 and the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959 and
concluded that Congress made the "deliberate choice to exclude antitrust remedies" for
secondary activities and "hot cargo" agreements. Id. at 650.
99. Id. at 655. Justice Stewart was quoting from an earlier opinion that he wrote in
Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964).
100. Id. at 639-40.
101. 325 U.S. 821 (1945).
102. Id. Justice Stewart's dissent quotes the following language from Hunt v. Crumboch,
325 U.S. 821, 825 n.1 (1945): "That which Congress has recognized as lawful, this Court
has no constitutional power to declare unlawful, by arguing that Congress has accorded
too much power to labor organizations." 421 U.S. at 640.
103. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 485 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
104. "As the parties to collective bargaining arrangements become more sensitive to
the antitrust implications of their conduct, antitrust actions will be increasingly utilized
to supplement traditional collective bargaining weapons; antitrust suits will be viewed
as a means of recouping losses at the bargaining table." DiCola, supra note 34, at 725.
97.
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and attorneys' fees even though he signed the illegal agreement. Possibly, the
Court was motivated by a recognition of labor's growing power base and
concluded that unions no longer needed the broad exemption from federal
antitrust law.105
Trying to equalize the balance between labor and management by increasing access to federal antitrust remedies is a misguided approach. Redress for unfair labor practices should be handled by an appeal to the
National Labor Relations Board. 1°0 Treble damages and criminal sanctions
under the Sherman Act are severe penalties that could easily upset the delicate
balance between labor and management. 0 7 Congress has dearly enunciated
a policy in favor of peaceful settlement of labor disputes. 08 It is consistent
with this policy to require employers to file a complaint with the NLRB
alleging an unfair labor practice rather than to sign the agreement and
then to institute an antitrust suit.109 In the instant case the contractor raised
the issue that the NLRB had refused to issue a complaint in a similar case
in which a union picketed a general contractor in order to obtain a "hot
cargo" agreement; 1 0 however, here Connell, the general contractor, did not
file charges with the NLRB alleging an unfair labor practice."' Even if the
contractor could not obtain review of its contention that the union had
committed an unfair labor practice,"12 this does not mean that the contractor

105. Recently, unions have instituted antitrust suits against employers who conspire
with other employers to deny the union the right to lawfully organize their employees.
See International Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers v. United
Contractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1973), modified, 494 F.2d 1353 (1974); Carpenters
District Council v. United Contractors Ass'n, 484 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1973). To date, the
unions' efforts have met with scant success. The lower federal courts have consistently
found that the unions' complaint in such cases stated facts that constituted an unfair
labor practice. See, e.g., Prepmore Apparel v. Amalgamated Cloth Workers of America,
431 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 401 U.S. 993, cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971).
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts have certified all labor issues to the
NLRB and stayed the antitrust proceeding until the Board has made findings of fact
and conclusions of law on the labor issues. Both in Jewel Tea and Connell, however, the
Supreme Court circumvented the doctrine of primary jurisdiction by holding that "federal
courts may decide labor law questions that emerge as collateral issues in suits brought
under independent federal remedies." Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S.
616, 626 (1975); Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 684-88 (1965).
Consequently, this holding should apply as well to suits instituted by labor unions, provided
that the union can establish as its main claim a violation of the antitrust law. These developments may give rise to increasing utilization of federal antitrust remedies by both parties
in a labor dispute.
106. See Comment, Union-Employer Agreements and the Antitrust Laws, The Pennington and Jewel Tea Cases, 114 U. PA. L. Rav. 901, 935-37 (1966).
107. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
108. Act of June 23, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, codified at 29 U.S.C. §151 (1970).
109. See Comment, supra note 104, at 935-36.
110. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 78 L.R.R.M. 3012, 3014 (N.D. Tex.
1971). In this related case, an appeal from a refusal to issue a complaint was made to
the General Counsel of the NLRB in Washington and was also denied. Id.
111. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir. 1973).
112. During the course of this litigation, other remedies were suggested by which the
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should be allowed to file an antitrust suit 123 "[A]ndtrust doctrines throw
scant light on the best means of resolving the conflicts of interest among
1 Moreover, judicial decisions in
employers, employees and labor unions.""4

antitrust suits "contain intrinsic limitations making them unsuited" to the
formulation of a consistent national labor policy. 1 5
The flaw in judicial attempts to resolve the conflict between the goals

of collective bargaining and free competition is the absence of any principle

the courts can utilize in determining where the balance should be struck.1 6
The distinction between legitimate union interests and illegitimate restraints

on the product market is often blurred. As a result, court decisions will appear
arbitrary, simply reflecting the economic philosophy of the judicial decision-

maker.
Legislation is needed to give the courts definitive guidelines when
determining labor's exposure to antitrust suits. Congress should identify those
union activities that go beyond the protection of national labor policy and

attempt to restrict competition among employers."

7

In this legislation, no

distinctions should be drawn between a union acting alone or through an

agreement with a nonlabor party, for in either instance the union can impose
commercial competition restraints that violate the antitrust laws. Disputes

that do not involve relationships between employer and employees should
not automatically be subjected to more rigid scrutiny; instead, the lines

drawn by Congress should have a rational relation to the ends sought to be
protected.2 8 Congress should reaffirm protection for labor activities that are
aimed at organization and collective bargaining. Of course, legislation" will
not create a complete solution, but it will relieve the courts from the need

general contractor could gain review of its charge that the "hot cargo" agreement was
invalid. The Fifth Circuit suggested that Connell could violate the contract with the union
and then raise as a defense to the union's resultant claim of an unfair labor practice that
the agreement was illegal under the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 1174. If the
picketing to obtain the agreement was an unfair labor practice under §8(b)(4) of the
N.L.R.A. (see note 95 supra), then ConneU had the right to recover actual damages sustained under §303 of the Labor Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. §187 (1970). Thus,
Justice Stewart noted that the remedy under §303 would include "any provable damage
caused by Connell's inability to subcontract mechanical work to nonunion firms." 421 U.S.
at 649.
113. This was an argument advanced by Judge Lewis Morgan in his majority opinion
for the Fifth Circuit. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154, 1174 (5th
Cir. 1973).
114. Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws -A PreliminaryAnalysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252,

261 (1955).
115. Id. at 262.
116. See Winter, supra note 7, at 16-17. For an opposing view propounding the
balancing test as a more reasonable approach than the "per se rule" of the Hutcheson-Allen
Bradley decisions, see Willis, In Defense of the Court: Accommodation of Conflicting National Policies, Labor and the Antitrust Laws, 22 MRc=a L. Ray. 561, 576-79 (1971).
117. For a legislative proposal along this line, see Cox, supra note 114, at 284 n.117

(1955).
118. See note 34 supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss2/17

16

636

Paulsen:UNIVERSITY
Labor's Exemption
from Federal Antitrust Law: The[Vol.
Diminishing
Pro
OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
XXVIII

to make unguided judgments as to what the proper balance should be between the goals of free competition and those of labor organization." 9
JAMES

G.

PAULSEN

119. "Borderline cases can be left to the courts with the assurance that our labor
unions will remain strong and our economy competitive regardless of the outcome. On
the other hand, the experience of organized labor under the Sherman Act seems adequate
justification for insisting that only the truly borderline cases be left for judicial decision."
Cox, supra note 114, at 283.
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